Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 71 | Issue 3

Article 7

2006

Where Everybody Knows Your Name:
Compulsory Identification and the Fallacy of the
Hiibel Majority
William H. Weisman

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
William H. Weisman, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: Compulsory Identification and the Fallacy of the Hiibel Majority, 71 Brook. L.
Rev. (2006).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol71/iss3/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Where Everybody Knows Your Name
COMPULSORY IDENTIFICATION AND THE FALLACY
OF THE HIIBEL MAJORITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects the individual from unwarranted
government intrusion by requiring that a search or seizure be
predicated upon a finding of probable cause. 1 However, not
every search and seizure necessitates a finding of probable
cause. In its landmark 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio, 2 the
United States Supreme Court annunciated an exception to the
probable cause requirement. The Terry Court held that a
police officer acting pursuant to the less-stringent standard of
“reasonable suspicion” of criminality is permitted to stop a
person for a period of brief duration in order to take additional
steps to investigate. 3 The Court ruled that this type of
investigative stop does not infringe upon a citizen’s Fourth
Amendment right. 4 Thus, the concept of a “Terry stop” was
adopted into American jurisprudence. 5 In addition to adopting
1

The Fourth Amendment states

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3
Id. at 30. “Reasonable suspicion” is defined as a “particularized and
objective basis, supported by specific and articuable facts, for suspecting a person of
criminal activity.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1487 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004).
For example, in Terry, the Court cited, along with other factors, Officer McFadden’s
(the investigating officer) three decades of police experience, his meticulous observation
of the three suspects, and the fact that the suspects appeared to be behaving in a
manner suggestive of a “preface to a ‘stick-up,’” as supporting the conclusion that
criminal activity was underway. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5, 28.
4
Terry, 392 U.S. at 31.
5
A Terry stop is the least intrusive form of constitutional “seizure,”
requiring only a finding of reasonable suspicion that criminality is afoot. See id. at 21.
A Terry stop occurs when, by means of physical force or by show of authority, a police
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the reasonable suspicion standard, the Terry Court also
annunciated the “stop and frisk” doctrine, which grants an
officer, in the course of conducting a valid Terry stop, the
authority to compel a suspect to submit to a pat-down frisk. 6
However, merely performing a Terry stop does not provide law
enforcement with a blanket invitation to conduct a compulsory
frisk. The Terry Court clearly articulated the rule that the
police may frisk a suspect only when an officer has a
reasonably appreciable fear that the particular suspect may be
“an armed and dangerous individual.” 7 Thus, in implementing
the rules which govern an investigative stop undertaken
pursuant to a mere reasonable suspicion of criminality, the
Court struck a middle ground of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, balancing the “intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests” with the “promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.” 8 By strictly regulating the
duration, scope, and content of the stop, the Court explicitly
sought to limit the intrusion occasioned on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests, thereby preserving the
protection of individual integrity which lies at the very
foundation of the Fourth Amendment. Unfortunately, in its
recent decision in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of
Nevada, 9 the Supreme Court disregarded the Fourth
Amendment ideals advanced in the Terry decision.
In a 5-4 opinion, the Hiibel Court upheld the validity of
a Nevada statute which requires a suspect, under pain of
arrest and monetary fine, to identify himself by name to law
enforcement personnel when detained pursuant to the
reasonable suspicion standard annunciated in Terry. 10
Commonly referred to as stop and identify statutes, compulsory
identification laws exist in varying composition in some twenty
states. 11 However, as explained throughout the course of this
officer, acting pursuant to a reasonable suspicion, briefly detains an individual such
that “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
6
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
7
Id.
8
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
9
542 U.S. 177 (2004).
10
Id. at 179, 181, 188-89.
11
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123(3) (2001); ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (1995); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1) (1997); COLO. REV. Stat. § 16-3-103(1) (2005); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1902, 1321(6) (2003); FLA. STAT. § 856.021(2) (2003); GA. CODE ANN. 1611-36(b) (2003); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1)
(1995); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 215.1(A) (West 2004); MO. REV. STAT.
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Note, Nevada’s statute is particularly troublesome in that it
requires identification pursuant only to the lessened standard
of reasonable suspicion. The intrusion authorized by the
Nevada statute is of such a substantial degree that it can not
be reconciled with the Terry Court’s criminal procedure
jurisprudence and the protections afforded the individual in the
Fourth Amendment.
As implicitly acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
Terry, providing the individual with protection from
unnecessary, overbroad governmental intrusions is an
essential component of any truly free society. 12 Illustrating the
ideals advanced in Terry, author Ayn Rand articulated the
need for the individual to be free from unwarranted intrusions,
writing “Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy.
The savage’s whole existence is public, ruled by the laws of his
tribe. Civilization is the process of setting man free from
In affirming the constitutionality of Nevada’s
men.” 13
compulsory identification requirement, the Hiibel Court
implicitly rejected the idea advanced in Terry and so eloquently
articulated in Rand’s prose, concerning the outright necessity
of a relatively substantial degree of anonymity in a society
which aspires to safeguard the rights and integrity of the
individual. In rendering its opinion, the Hiibel majority
blatantly disregarded the implicit ideals regarding individual
integrity and personal freedom embodied in the Fourth
Amendment and espoused by the Terry Court, which sought to
promote the interests of law enforcement without denigrating
the rights of the individual.
This Note will demonstrate that a compulsory
identification requirement predicated upon a finding of a
reasonable suspicion of criminality is incompatible with the
ideals set forth in the Fourth Amendment. Part II of this Note
sets forth the factual circumstance which gave rise to the
dispute at issue in Hiibel. Part III explains the legal rationale
advanced in the opinion crafted by the Hiibel majority. Part IV
§ 84.710(2) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401(2)(a) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829
(1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:2, 644:6 (2001); N.M. STAT. § 30-22-3 (2004); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50(1) (Consol. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (1991); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 24 §
1983 (Supp. 2005); WIS. STAT. § 968.24 (2003).
12
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310
(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)) (“The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and
justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”).
13
AYN RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD 715 (25th Anniversary Ed. 1968).
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of this Note seeks to demonstrate that the Hiibel majority
failed to adequately comprehend the nature of the intrusion
occasioned by Nevada’s compulsory identification requirement.
Part V of this Note will demonstrate that Nevada’s statute is so
overbroad in scope that it cannot be reconciled with the Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, Part VI of this
Note proposes legislative alternatives which aspire to reach a
more appropriate middle-ground between the promotion of
legitimate, socially beneficial law enforcement interests and
the constitutional protections afforded the individual.
II.

THE FACTS OF HIIBEL

In order to best comprehend the intrusion constituted
by compelled identification authorized by a mere reasonable
suspicion, it is necessary to understand the specific factual
circumstance in which the dispute at issue in Hiibel arose. On
a clear Nevada afternoon, the sheriff’s department of Humboldt
County, Nevada, received a telephone call from a caller who
reported seeing a man assault a woman in a silver and red
G.M.C. truck on Grass Valley Road. 14 Deputy Lee Dove was
dispatched to investigate the caller’s report. Deputy Dove soon
located a truck matching the caller’s description parked on the
side of Grass Valley Road. The deputy observed skid marks in
the gravel immediately behind the vehicle, leading him to
conclude that the truck had come to an abrupt stop. 15 A man
was standing by the rear of the truck and a young woman was
seated in the passenger compartment. 16
Deputy Dove approached the man, who appeared to be
inebriated, and explained that he was investigating a reported
fight. 17 The deputy asked the man if he had “any identification
on [him],” but the man declined to identify himself and instead
inquired why the deputy wanted to see his identification. 18
Deputy Dove responded that he was conducting an
investigation and therefore needed to see his identification.
The unidentified man grew agitated, vehemently insisting that
he had done nothing wrong. Deputy Dove explained that he
wanted to find out who the man was and what he was doing on
14
15
16
17
18

Hiibel, 542 U.S. 177, 180 (2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 181.
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the side of the road. 19 The man continued to refuse compliance
with the identification request and began to taunt the deputy. 20
The man placed his hands behind his back, as if waiting to be
handcuffed, and repeatedly told the deputy to take him to jail. 21
For a period of several minutes Deputy Dove continued, eleven
times in all, to request identification. 22 Each request was
rebuffed by the unidentified man. After repeatedly warning
that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse the
identification request, the deputy placed the man under
arrest. 23
It was later determined that the unidentified man
arrested by Deputy Dove was Larry Dudley Hiibel. 24 The state
of Nevada, citing Nevada Revised Statute § 171.123, an
ordinance which defines the legal rights and duties of a police
officer in the context of an investigative stop (or Terry stop),
argued that Hiibel had obstructed Deputy Dove from carrying
out his duties during an investigative stop. 25 The Justice Court
of Union Township held that in refusing to identify himself, as
required by Nevada Revised Statute § 171.123, Hiibel
“obstructed and delayed [Deputy] Dove as a public officer in
attempting to discharge his duty,” thereby violating Nevada
Revised Statute §199.80. 26 On appeal, Hiibel argued that
Nevada Revised Statute § 171.123, which required him to
identify himself to the investigating officer, violated the rights
granted him by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the

19

Id.
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 181 (2004).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. To view the confrontation between Deputy Dove and Hiibel in its
entirety, as captured by the dashboard video recorder mounted in Dove’s patrol car, one
can visit http://papersplease.org/hiibel/facts2.html.
24
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 181.
25
The statute states,
20

Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is
committing or is about to commit a crime . . . . The officer may detain the
person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity and the
suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so
detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other
inquiry of any peace officer.
NEV. REV. STAT. §171.123 (2001).
26
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 182.
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United States Constitution. 27 Unmoved by Hiibel’s argument,
Nevada’s intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
ruling. 28 The Supreme Court of Nevada issued a divided
opinion rejecting Hiibel’s challenge. 29 Subsequently, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 30
III.

THE HIIBEL MAJORITY’S RATIONALE

In upholding the Nevada statute as constitutional, the
Supreme Court began its analysis by setting forth the general
proposition that posing questions to a person suspected of
criminality comprises an essential component of police
investigatory powers. 31 After retracing fundamental aspects of
its Terry stop jurisprudence, the Hiibel Court concluded that
“the principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to
disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.” 32 Thus, the
Nevada statute, which requires a suspect to identify himself to
an investigating officer acting pursuant to a reasonable
In
suspicion of criminality, was deemed constitutional. 33
justifying its conclusion, the Court stated that the
reasonableness of a Terry stop seizure is determined “by
balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate government
interests.” 34 The Hiibel Court concluded that the Nevada
statute satisfied this balancing test because the identity
request had an “immediate relation to the purpose, rationale,
and practical demands of a Terry stop.” 35 The Court deemed
the identification request a mere “commonsense inquiry” 36
which served important government interests, including
allowing the officer to gain knowledge regarding a suspect’s
past criminal activity, propensity for violence, and history of
mental disorder. 37 The Court further stated that knowledge of
27
Id. The sheer number and complexity of the Firth Amendment issues
raised in Hiibel prevent in-depth discussion of such concerns within the confines of this
note.
28
Id. at 182.
29
Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 59 P.3d 1201, 1202, 1207 (Nev. 2002).
30
Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 540 U.S. 965 (2003).
31
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 185.
32
Id. at 187.
33
Id. at 182-83, 189-91.
34
Id. at 188 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
35
Id. at 188.
36
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189.
37
Id. at 186.
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a suspect’s identity “may help clear a suspect and allow the
police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere.” 38 The threat of
arrest and criminal sanction was deemed necessary in order to
ensure that the identity request did not become a legal
nullity. 39 The Hiibel majority concluded that because it did not
change the duration or location of the detention, the
compulsory name requirement did not alter the fundamental
nature of the actual Terry stop. 40
Additionally, the Court went on to dispense with the
argument that the compulsory identification requirement
allowed law enforcement to perform an end-run around the
probable cause requirement, 41 in effect permitting an officer to
arrest a person merely for appearing suspicious. 42 The majority
stated that the individual is protected from arbitrary police
intrusion by the “requirement that a Terry stop must be
justified at its inception and ‘reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified’ the initial stop.” 43 An officer is
prevented from placing a suspect under arrest for refusing to
identify himself if the request was not sufficiently related to
the circumstances justifying the stop. 44 The Court concluded
that Deputy Dove’s request for identification was reasonably
related to the circumstances which justified the stop. The
deputy was seeking to further his investigation into an alleged
assault and thus was not seeking to obtain an arrest for failure
to identify after the Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence. 45
Thus, Nevada’s compulsory identification requirement, which
requires a suspect to disclose his identity when detained by a
law enforcement officer conducting an investigative stop
pursuant to a finding of reasonable suspicion, was found to be
consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

38

Id.
Id. at 188.
40
Id.. at 188.
41
Probable cause exists where the “facts and circumstances within [the
officer’s] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense had been or is being committed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1239 (Bryan A.
Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004).
42
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188.
43
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
44
Id. at 188.
45
Id. at 189.
39
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IV.

THE HIIBEL MAJORITY FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
CONSIDER THE NATURE OF THE INTRUSION OCCASIONED
BY A COMPULSORY IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT

A.

The Wealth of Information Available to Law
Enforcement upon Obtaining Knowledge of an
Individual’s Identity Constitutes a Substantial Intrusion

The reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment is determined “by balancing its intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion
of legitimate government interests.” 46 In Terry, the Court
explicitly acknowledged that a frisk, when conducted during an
investigatory stop initiated pursuant only to a mere reasonable
suspicion, was inherently intrusive. 47 Nevertheless, the Court
ultimately found that such an intrusion was consistent with
the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment
because the imposition experienced by the individual was both
“limited” and “brief”. 48 However, Nevada’s compulsory name
requirement has the potential to be far more invasive than the
limited pat-down authorized by Terry.
At first glance, the idea that compelled identification
constitutes a serious intrusion on the individual, perhaps even
more so than the degradation experienced by an individual
made to endure the physical touching of a frisk, may seem a
somewhat untenable proposition. After all, even a peripheral
survey of American jurisprudence reveals the idea that our
system of legality has long supported the notion that a person’s
physical sanctity is of the utmost importance. 49 However, when
gauging the intrusion posed by compelled identification, one
must remember that the frisk authorized by Terry is highly
constricted and subject to numerous binding restraints. Since
the sole justification for the frisk is protection of law
enforcement personnel and nearby citizenry, the pat-down is
confined in scope to that which is necessary to determine if the
46

Id. at 188 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 25 (stating that even a limited search of the outer
clothing “must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating
experience”).
48
Id. at 24-25, 27.
49
For example, tort law permits recovery, be it nominal, for even the
slightest offensive touch or bodily contact sufficient to offend a reasonable sense of
personal dignity. See AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON, TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 21 (2003).
47
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suspect is concealing hidden instruments capable of inflicting
harm upon the officer. 50 However, unlike the fleeting, limited,
highly regulated frisk authorized by the Terry Court, the
compulsory name requirement at issue in Hiibel authorizes a
totally unrestrained intrusion.
Writing during a far simpler time, Shakespeare once
In this
rhetorically pondered “What’s in a name?” 51
unprecedented era of information, knowledge of one’s name,
particularly in the hands of law enforcement personnel, has far
greater significance than at any other time in human history,
certainly more so than it did in Elizabethan England. While
Shakespeare sought to impress upon his audience that a name
can be relatively inconsequential, 52 in the context of a twentyfirst century citizen/police encounter, one’s identity is of the
utmost significance. Today’s technological society allows for
instant access to seemingly endless quantities of highly
personal information. A name is no longer just a verbal
construct used merely for identification purposes, but instead
provides the password for an innumerable array of both public
and private cross-referenced databases, each capable of
exposing the most intimate details of an individual’s life. 53
For instance, Massachusetts State Troopers, recently
equipped with mobile Black-Berry devices, can instantaneously
link to databases containing information on an estimated
ninety-eight percent of adults residing in the United States. 54

50
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (“The sole justification of the search in
the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it
must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover
guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.”).
51
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2, line 43 (G.
Blakemore Evans ed., Cambridge University Press) (2003).
52
Shakespeare’s Juliet further states “That which we call a rose, by any
other word would smell as sweet.” Id. The contention is that in this passage Juliet
seeks to imply that a name is an artificial and meaningless convention. See William
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Famous Quotes, http://www.enotes.com/romeo/276 (last
visited Nov. 17, 2005).
53
Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al.
at 3, Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (No. 03-5554). Certainly,
concerns about the degree of information accessible to officers when supplied with a
suspect’s name were central to Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion, in which he wrote
“A name can provide the key to a broad array of information about [a] person,
particularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of law enforcement
databases.” Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54
Keith Reed, Logan Troopers To Get Roving Database Access, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 22, 2004, at F1. In the article, Reed quotes Jon Latorella, chief executive
of LocatePlus, a company that collects records about individuals and rents access to
this information to various law enforcement agencies, as stating “A name, that’s all [a
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Provided only with a person’s name, the troopers access a
wealth of personal information, ranging anywhere from Social
Security numbers to unlisted telephone numbers to names on a
lease. 55 As information linked to identification has increasingly
become part of daily life in America, it is now apparent that
there is seemingly no limit to the information available to
With terrorism
properly equipped officers of the law. 56
prevention occupying a prominent place of concern for the
collective law enforcement community, it would seem likely
that funding will only become more readily available for
municipalities wishing to upgrade their intelligence gathering
and information sharing capabilities. 57 Such technological
proliferation has eroded many of the traditional barriers that
once inhibited efficient information sharing amongst various
members of the law enforcement community. For example,
both New York and Vermont recently announced participation
in a new multi-jurisdictional law enforcement program which
provides field officers with the capability to relay information
about a suspect to a command outpost, which can then
instantaneously cross-reference such information across
numerous databases and law enforcement information
repositories. 58 To be certain, information sharing is not a new
phenomenon. An informal national network of identification
systems has long been in development, spurred by the intricate
intermingling of government databases and identification
requirements which accompanied several federal legislative
initiatives that combined demands for identification with

police officer] needs. . . . [The officer] can find out who you lived with, where you lived,
anything about you.” Id.
55
Id.
56
See Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Issues, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 697, 706 (2004) (discussing, in the context of the
potential for a national identification card requirement, the degree to which
information gathering by both public and private entities has become common-place in
American society).
57
See Brendan Lyons, Albany Initiative Aims to Break Down Barriers to
Sharing Anti-Terror Reports, TIMES UNION, May 26, 2004, at A1 (reporting that a
counter terrorism intelligence initiative aimed at facilitating information sharing and
involving collaboration between federal and state authorities, recently instituted in
New York and Vermont, might be expanded to other states in the Northeast and across
the nation).
58
Id. In Lyon’s article Robert Mueller, director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, promised that the newly instituted information systems installed in New
York and Vermont would provide a “‘seamless flow of intelligence’ to street level cops in
‘real time.’” Id.
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extensive computerized records. 59
The effect of this
intermingling of stored data is that the most intimate details of
a person’s existence, ranging anywhere from travel habits to
financial status, are readily accessible to law enforcement
agencies. When authorizing a seizure predicated only upon a
mere reasonable suspicion of criminality, the Terry Court, in all
likelihood, never intended that their decision would lay the
framework for such a substantial, seemingly limitless
intrusion.
Unfettered access to limitless sources of information
cannot coexist with the ideals of restraint and individual
autonomy embodied in the Fourth Amendment and advanced
in the Terry decision. For illustrative purposes, consider the
specific facts of Terry. Having observed Terry and his cohorts
behaving in what appeared to be the preparatory stage of an
armed robbery, it was deemed a perfectly logical and
appropriate exercise of his law enforcement duties for the
investigating officer to question the men about their purpose
for being on the street and their particular interest in the
jewelry shop’s storefront. The Terry Court concluded that
inquiries made during an investigative stop were to be
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified” the initial stop. 60 Thus, the Terry Court advanced the
proposition that investigative detention predicated upon a
mere finding of reasonable suspicion was to be limited to that
necessary to confirm or dispel suspicion.61 However, in seeming
total disregard for the guidelines advanced in Terry, there
exists no limit whatsoever to the information available when a
suspect is compelled to reveal his identity. Thus, the practical
result of the Hiibel decision is that, rather than limit law
enforcement inquiry to that necessary to dispel suspicion,
police are now empowered to gain access to highly personal
information totally unrelated to the circumstances of the stop.
Such information might include: where the suspect used to live,
59
Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National
Identification Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 323 (2002) (identifying legislation
contributing to the formation of a de facto national information and identification
system as including the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and the Transportation Security
Administration’s ID requirement and Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening
System).
60
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
61
Id. at 30.
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where he currently resides, with whom he resides, his phone
number, his license plate, his financial history, and even his
Indeed, this seemingly extensive list
travel habits. 62
constitutes merely a sampling of the potential information
available to law enforcement upon production of one’s
identity. 63
Respect for personal autonomy, an idea which
inherently encompasses the ability to remain as a relatively
anonymous individual absent a truly worthy government
interest which might justify a limited intrusion, is an essential
component of the protection of personal integrity at the very
heart of the Fourth Amendment. Terry sought to ensure that
persons detained pursuant to a mere reasonable suspicion of
criminality would not be made to relinquish their entitlement
of substantial protection from invasions of their individual
integrity. Certainly, rational persons concerned with crime
prevention would agree that access to information is an
important and necessary component of effective policing. We
all are fortunate to live in an age where law enforcement has at
their disposal numerous technological tools with which they
can combat societal ills. However, the sheer wizardry of
today’s technological age is such that providing a name to law
enforcement has a fundamentally different connotation than it
did even a mere 20 years ago. Due to the special significance
associated with a name in the hands of law enforcement in this
era of unprecedented information, compelled identification
pursuant to a mere reasonable suspicion is fundamentally
incompatible with the protection of personal integrity embodied
in the Fourth Amendment and advanced in the Terry decision.

62

See, e.g., Keith Reed, Logan Troopers To Get Roving Database Access,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 2004, at F1. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC) et al. at 5, Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177
(2004) (No. 03-5554) (commenting that “[p]olice officers today have access to an
extraordinary range of detailed personal information” and detailing, with specific
examples, the extensive information available to law enforcement).
63
See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et
al. at 3,5, Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (No. 03-5554). The
amicus brief submitted by the Electronic Privacy Information Center documents the
vast array of personal information available to law enforcement upon accessing various
databases. Id.
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Compelled Identification Leads to a Permanent Record
of the Citizen/Police Interaction, Thereby Heightening
the Intrusion Occasioned by Compelled Identification
Such That It Is Unreasonable

Furthering the intrusion constituted by the compulsory
identification requirement at issue in Hiibel is the fact that
compelled identification leads to a permanent, everlasting
record of the citizen/police encounter. There is no disputing
that all Terry stops, irrespective of the circumstances,
constitute an intrusion upon the individual. 64 However, prior
to Hiibel, when the limited investigation that accompanied the
stop failed to create circumstances amounting to probable
cause which would justify further, heightened police/citizen
interaction, the individual was free to go on his way.
Notwithstanding the brief intrusion, and the psychic harm
which inevitably accompanies the situation where an
individual is confronted by adversarial law enforcement
personnel, 65 the individual emerged from the encounter
relatively unscathed. Barring voluntary identification, there
was frequently no record of the stop which would forever link
the individual with his detainment at the hands of police.
However, following the ruling in Hiibel, an individual detained
pursuant to reasonable suspicion will no longer possess the
ability to carry on after the stop as a relatively anonymous
individual.
When an investigative stop pursuant to reasonable
suspicion is accompanied by a compulsory identification
requirement, every such detention will result in a permanent
record of the encounter. According to Mary Hoffman, a staff
attorney with the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the
reality of a compulsory identification requirement like that at
issue in Hiibel is that every Terry stop will be recorded and
added to information gathering systems. 66 Therefore, stop and
64
Chief Justice Warren opinioned that a Terry stop, particularly when
accompanied by a frisk, is a “severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal
security.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25. Justice Warren further stated “it must surely be
an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.” Id. at 25.
65
See Steinbock, supra note 56 at 740 (“Identification checkpoints, it may be
argued, have an additional subjective effect on a grand scale: the psychic harm to free
people of having to ‘show your papers’. . . .”).
66
Ms. Hofman stated “Every little time something like this happens, the
police question you and want to know who you are, it’s an incident that gets put into a
database. And there will be a record of it thereafter, regardless of whether you did
anything wrong.” Gabriel Syme, Fighting For Right Not to Show ID, White Rose
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identify statutes not only provide law enforcement with an
opportunity to check existing databases, they also generate
new data by continuously inputting additional, increasingly
detailed information about the detained individual. 67 Every
subsequent Terry stop would present a new opportunity for law
enforcement to input additional information into database
receptacles, thereby facilitating increased government
Such intrusive data
surveillance of a person’s behavior. 68
compilation resulting from an investigatory stop greatly
increases the imposition experienced by the individual
subjected to the encounter. 69
Feelings of a loss of personal anonymity are especially
heightened when the investigative detainment fails to escalate
to a degree warranting arrest. The individual, having already
endured the harrowing experience of detention by adversarial
authorities, is further intruded upon in that they compile a
documented police record, even though his behavior proved
entirely insufficient to warrant an arrest, let alone an
While it recognized that an
indictment or conviction. 70
investigatory stop pursuant to a mere reasonable suspicion was
an “annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating
experience,” 71 the Terry Court nevertheless authorized
detainment pursuant to a reasonable suspicion of criminality
because it deemed the intrusion upon the individual to be both
“brief” and “limited.” 72 However, contrary to Terry, compelled
identification pursuant only to a mere reasonable suspicion of
criminality has the practical effect of turning a highly
restrained intrusion into an everlasting, ceaseless intrusion in
the form of a permanent police record which will forever follow

Privacy Archives, available at http://whiterose.samizdata.net/archives/005632.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2005).
67
Steinbock, supra note 56, at 744-58 (discussing, in the context of the
potential for a national identification card requirement, the various ways in which data
is generated, collected, and retained).
68
Id. at 709 (“Each identification encounter would be an occasion to add
information to the central database, facilitating government surveillance of movement
and activity.”).
69
Id. at 755 (“There is no question that retaining data from a stop adds to its
intrusiveness when that data is linked to a particular person.”).
70
Id. at 755 (Commenting that feelings of intrusion become especially
palpable when an “investigative stop does not lead to arrest; an individual could
acquire a police ‘record’ for activities that were not criminal enough to produce an
arrest, much less a conviction.”).
71
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968).
72
Id. at 25-26.
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the individual. 73 Such an effect is entirely contrary to the
implicit principles of government restraint and protection from
over-intrusive, unreasonable invasions of individual autonomy
which lie at the very heart of the Terry Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
C.

The Hiibel Majority Failed to Consider the Degree to
Which the Intrusion Occasioned by a Compulsory
Identification Requirement Will Disproportionately
Affect Minority Citizenry

The intrusiveness of a statute authorizing compelled
identification pursuant to reasonable suspicion, especially in
light of the potential for unfettered, highly invasive data
collection, will disproportionately affect the minority citizenry.
The Warren Court, which decided Terry, presided during one of
the most trying periods in American history 74 and thus was
greatly influenced by the social landscape of the time. The
Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence, in particular its
decision in Terry, was swayed by the civil rights movement
which had come to dominate the headlines throughout the
1950’s and 1960’s. 75 A prominent concern in the struggle for
racial equality was the widespread, pervasive mistreatment of
African-Americans perpetrated by police departments across
the nation. 76 The abuses perpetrated on African-Americans by
73
Steinbock, supra note 56, at 755 (“[D]ata collection and retention clearly
adds to the imposition of a Terry stop. Now, instead of the ‘brief intrusion’ described by
the Court in Terry, the individual has a ‘brief intrusion’ plus an endless record, not only
of having been in a particular place at a particular time but also perhaps of having
generated reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Because Terry was decided by
balancing the governmental need for investigative stops against their degree of
individual intrusion, this additional imposition threatens to upset Terry’s balance.”).
74
David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 7 (1994) (commenting that when Terry reached the Supreme Court,
“American society seemed to be fraying at the edges. A palpable climate of unrest had
settled over the nation.”).
75
Id. at 43 (“[T]he civil rights struggles of the 1950’s and 1960’s were part of
the reason (if not the reason) for the Warren Court’s concern with criminal procedure
in general and with stop and frisks in particular.”); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court
and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 (1969) (“The Court’s concern with
criminal procedure can be understood only in the context of the struggle for civil
rights.”).
76
Harris, supra note 74, at 8 (discussing the mistreatment of AfricanAmericans by police as a backdrop for the Terry decision); Pye, supre note 75, at 256
(“If the Court’s espousal of equality before the law was to be credible, it required not
only that the poor [African-American] be permitted to vote and to attend school with
whites, but also that he and other disadvantaged individuals be able to exercise, as
well as posses, the same rights as the affluent white when suspected of crime.”).
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law enforcement authorities, particularly through the rampant
use of over-aggressive, unregulated stop and frisks, had come
to dominate the collective American consciousness.
The
President’s
Commission
on
Law
Enforcement
and
Administration of Justice directly acknowledged the
proliferation of such ill-treatment inflicted upon minorities by
police conducting investigatory stops, stating: “Misuse of field
interrogations . . . is causing serious friction with minority
groups in many localities. This is becoming particularly true
as more police departments adopt ‘aggressive patrols’ in which
officers are encouraged to routinely stop and question persons
Through the annunciation of clear
on the street . . . .” 77
constitutional guidelines regulating investigatory stops, the
Terry Court sought to revitalize the deteriorating relationship
between African-Americans and the law enforcement
However, a compulsory identification
community. 78
requirement such as that which exists in Nevada is
inconsistent with the inherent ideals of Terry in that such
statutes will only heighten tensions between minorities and the
police, thereby directly escalating the very problem the Terry
Court intended to combat.
Unfortunately, racism in the criminal justice system,
especially in the context of contemporary stop and frisk law, is
an intractable, highly corrosive social ill. Numerous studies
have demonstrated that in practice, police frequently utilize
race as a proxy for criminality when deciding whether to stop a
potential suspect. 79 Further escalating the perception of an
apparent racial bias in the methodology of criminal law
enforcement, contemporary criminal procedure jurisprudence
has begun to whittle away at the Terry Court’s attempt to
improve minority/police relations through the establishment of
77

TASK FORCE ON THE POLICE, PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE
184 (1967).
78
See Pye, supra note 75, at 256 (commenting that the Warren Court could
not “ignore the clear evidence that members of disadvantaged groups generally bore
the brunt of most unlawful police activity”).
79
Harris, supra note 74, at 4. See also MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL.,
WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY, 149-50 (2003) (reporting,
in the context of a discussion concerning the findings of various studies documenting
the disproportionate representation of racial minorities in the American criminal
justice system, that “blacks and those otherwise fitting the delinquent stereotype were
more likely to be stopped and interrogated ‘often even in the absence of evidence that
an offense has been committed’”); Sheri L. Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a
Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 214 (1983) (“Police still view race as an important factor in
the decision to detain a suspect.”).
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strict guidelines regulating investigatory stops not predicated
upon a finding of probable cause. 80 A prime example of such
activity can be seen in the fact that courts dispersed
throughout the nation have upheld Terry stops based merely on
an individual’s presence in a high-crime locale, coupled with an
observation of the individual exhibiting evasive behavior
towards the police. 81 The result of this judicial acquiescence, of
what, at best, might be termed questionable justification for an
investigative stop is that a vastly inordinate number of Terry
stops now occur in predominately minority neighborhoods,
which in urban settings tend to have a higher crime rate. 82
Authorizing the “location plus evasion matrix” as a justification
for the finding of a reasonable suspicion ignores the well
documented fact that many persons of color residing in the
United States, for historic reasons, entertain an entirely
reasonable fear of police authority. 83 Thus, such persons are
behaving rationally when they seek to employ evasive
measures designed to avoid unnecessary, unwarranted police
80

David A. Harris, Factors For Reasonable Suspicion, When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660 (1994) (explaining that in the twenty
five years that followed the decision in Terry, case law gradually began to exceedingly
require less evidence to justify a investigative stop).
81
Id. at 680 (1994). See also United States v. Alexander, 907 F.2d 269 (2d
Cir. 1990) (discussing how under federal law principles, the “location plus evasion
matrix” is sufficient to justify police intrusion). Alexander’s car was double-parked in a
neighborhood known for the sale of illicit narcotics. Upon emerging from a residence,
Alexander got in his car and proceeded to drive while frequently looking in the rear
view mirror, allegedly indicating a fear of law enforcement surveillance, thereby
providing sufficient justification for the resultant Terry stop conducted by federal
agents under the authority of the Drug Enforcement Agency. Id. New York courts
have been rather progressive on this issue in that the state judiciary has recognized
the damaging effect of upholding such a basis for reasonable suspicion and accordingly
have exercised resistance to the theory that location plus evasion is sufficient to justify
an investigatory stop. See People v. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536, 540 (1989) (cautioning
against placing excessive weight on an individual’s location in finding reasonable
suspicion and stating that location “cannot serve as the justification for untoward or
excessive police behavior against those of our citizens who happen to live, work, or
travel in what are characterized as ‘high crime areas.’”); People v. Powell, 667 N.Y.S.2d
725, 728 (1998) (finding insufficient grounds for a determination of reasonable
suspicion where stop was based on defendant’s alleged evasive answers to police
questioning along with an observation of defendant walking swiftly with stiff arm
movements in a high crime area); In re James, 559 N.E.2d 1273, 1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d
114, 115 (1990) (stop of defendant was not justified where defendant was carrying a
heavy bag in an area prone to drug crime and weapons activity and defendant’s
companions fled upon the appearance of police officers).
82
Harris, supra note 80, at 660 (stating that minorities are more likely to live
in “so-called high crime areas”).
83
Id. at 681 (Noting that blacks and Hispanics have “become caught in a
vicious cycle . . . . Feeling understandably harassed, they wish to avoid the police and
act accordingly. This evasive behavior in (their own) high crime neighborhoods gives
the police that much more power to stop and frisk.”).
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interaction. Use of police tactics which dictate that a subclass
of citizens will be stopped more often merely because of their
race or ethnicity forces the minority populace to pay a far
higher price, in terms of sacrifice of individual integrity and
loss of autonomy, than their white counterparts. 84 The Hiibel
ruling will only exacerbate this unfair disposition.
As acknowledged by the Terry Court, but nevertheless
inexplicably disregarded by the majority in Hiibel, feelings of
unwarranted harassment heighten tensions between minority
citizens and police. 85 Such unrest, already heightened by
contemporary Terry stop procedures which disproportionately
target persons of color, will be substantially escalated due to
the Hiibel ruling. Minority citizens will now have to endure
not only the denigration associated with repeated,
unwarranted investigatory stops, but will also be forced to
tolerate the additional degradation of compelled identification.
When confronted with persistent police harassment, much of
the psychological armor which protects one’s self-dignity is
comprised of the ability to remain anonymous. The Supreme
Court implicitly seemed to agree with such a rationale, when,
prior to its decision in Hiibel, the Court stated that Terry stops
have a “non-threatening” character, in part because the
detained suspect “is not obliged to respond.” 86 Indeed, even the
individual willing to accept subjection to a Terry stop as a
necessary intrusion in a society which seeks to promote
obedience of the law surely takes great solace in the knowledge
that when the detainment is over, he can, at the very least, go
on his way in a state of relative anonymity. Hiibel has the
effect of stripping away this last remaining refuge for minority
citizens.
It seems an entirely logical conclusion that, especially in
blighted neighborhoods, a beat officer’s knowledge of a person’s
identity is a powerful law enforcement tool, so much so that it

84

See Harris, supra note 74, at 43-44.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (stating that African-Americans have
been subjected to “wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police
community”).
86
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (explaining why Terry
stops do not require the investigating officer to issue Miranda warnings). The Hiibel
majority held that Berkemer was not controlling because the cited statement merely
indicated that the Fourth Amendment itself cannot compel a suspect to answer
questions. The source of the legal obligation at issue in Hiibel arose not from the
Fourth Amendment, but from a state statute. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of Nev., 542
U.S. 177, 187 (2004).
85
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can lead to misuse and outright abuse. 87
Investigative
reporting performed by the Los Angeles Times in the wake of
erupting racial tensions in the city’s minority communities
revealed a commonly employed police tactic described by local
black residents as “The Routine.” 88 Young black males were
made to kneel with their fingers laced behind their head while
officers performed a pat-down frisk and conducted an
investigation. 89 Even where such interaction may fail to result
in arrest, it would seem that use of such tactics present police
officers with the opportunity to incrementally increase their
knowledge of suspected criminals and the activities in which
they engage. Certainly, it is of prominent importance that
police officers have the ability to collect information which will
aid in combating crime. 90 However, such a mindset produces
an inevitable paradox in that the “the more intrusive data
collection and retention, the greater its effectiveness is likely to
be.” 91 Thus, even the most well-meaning members of the law
enforcement community will inevitably feel the need to collect
and retain ever increasing amounts of information about an
individual suspect. This is quite troubling in that it disregards
the fact that the actual number of criminals dispersed in the
minority populace is undoubtedly relatively small, and
furthermore, the number likely to be successfully apprehended
by a Terry stop accompanied by compelled identification is even
smaller. 92 The likelihood for mistaken stops that nevertheless
result in the loss of anonymity and the input of information
regarding an entirely innocent individual, an individual
stopped, at least in part, because of ethnicity and the socio-

87
See Anne M. Coughlin, Simple Question, Big Implications, WASH. POST,
March 28, 2004, at B5 (speculating that police seeking to combat crime might
unnecessarily compel identification in a broad array of instances, including those
where the grounds for suspicion rests primarily upon the suspect’s race).
88
Harris, supra note 74, at 3.
89
Id. at 3-4.
90
In theory, the greater the amount of information available to law
enforcement, the more likely it is that police will be able to anticipate and prevent
crime. See Steinbock, supra note 56, at 736 (discussing, in the context of national
identity cards, collection of data in an effort to create a terrorist profile in order to foil
terrorist activity).
91
Id.
92
Cf. id. at 735-36 (commenting, within the context of a national
identification requirement as a means of terrorism prevention, that identification
requirements would have a relatively miniscule success rate because the number of
terrorists dispersed amongst the populace is small, and the number of those likely to be
apprehended by an identification requirement is even smaller).
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economic status of their community, is sure to be a far too
frequent occurrence. 93
Minorities in the United States, particularly AfricanAmericans, have endured a long, tragic legacy of police abuse
and ill-treatment. The Terry Court sought to combat such
unfair police practices when it enacted strict guidelines to
regulate police investigatory stops predicated upon a mere
suspicion of criminality. Hiibel, in authorizing a practice that
will inevitably worsen police/minority relations through the
disproportionate infliction of an unquantifiable, but
nevertheless harmful intrusion upon minority citizens,
represents a movement toward the very worst of pre-Terry
police/citizen interaction.
D.

Compelled Identification Inhibits Individual
Spontaneity, Thereby Greatly Amplifying the Intrusion

The noxious effect of a statute like that at issue in
Hiibel, while disproportionately effecting people of color, will
not be limited to predominately minority communities. The
pervasive feelings of intrusiveness that accompany a
compulsory identification requirement are far-reaching and are
likely to have the effect of curbing the spontaneity of existence
and the spirit of unencumbered individuality which has long
been an essential characteristic of life in the United States.
Freedom of existence, the ability to live, associate, and move
about free from over-bearing government intrusion is a key
component of the American existence. 94 In accordance with this

93

See id. (discussing how even with all the data available through terrorist
profiling software like CAPPS, a threat-detection passenger screening system
employed by commercial airlines operating in the United States, the occurrence of
“false positives” is frequent).
94
Americans have long cherished the ability to move freely, anonymously,
and unfettered throughout the vast confines of the nation’s territories. Since the
earliest days of our country Americans have possessed an explorative, free-spirited
nature. Lewis and Clark’s historic trek across the continent is forever engrained in
American lore. See, e.g., STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE: MERIWETHER
LEWIS, THOMAS JEFFERSON, AND THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1996). Famed
American author Jack Kerouac documented a generation of free-spirited beatniks who
journeyed across the continent in search of adventure and self-enlightenment, thereby
continuing the American tradition of spontaneity of existence. See, e.g., JACK
KEROUAC, ON THE ROAD (1957). The proliferation of the automobile, an invention
which would eventually take its place as a staple of American life, coupled with the
boost in interstate highway construction undertaken by the Eisenhower
administration, spurred countless individuals to take to “Route 66” and travel the
nation unfettered.
See, e.g., TOM LEWIS, DIVIDED HIGHWAYS: BUILDING THE
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deeply cherished tradition, the judiciary has consistently
acknowledged the fundamental role that freedom of movement
and spontaneity of existence has long occupied in our society. 95
However, compulsory identification requirements threaten to
stifle the unbridled existence which comprises an essential
component of American life. The compulsory identification
requirement at issue in Hiibel has the adverse effect of
substantially constricting freedom of movement and
suppressing spontaneity of existence, thereby heightening the
intrusion imposed upon the individual to a level entirely
inconsistent with the ideals espoused in the Fourth
Amendment and advanced in Terry.
Stop and identify statutes, and their close relative, antiloitering statutes, have their roots in centuries old English
laws specifically formulated to limit the behavior and stifle the
movement of society’s least fortunate. 96 Thus, the history of
INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS, TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LIFE 86-91 (1997); MICHAEL WALLIS,
ROUTE 66: THE MOTHER ROAD 2 (1990).
95
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (establishing that the
right to travel is a fundamental right in holding unconstitutional a California statutory
provision which denied welfare assistance to residents who have not resided within the
given jurisdiction for at least one year). The Shapiro court stated:
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our
constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be
free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by
statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this
movement.
Id. at 629. See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (citing the burden and
restriction on interstate travel occasioned by racial discrimination in restaurants in
finding that eateries which refused to serve African-American patrons were in violation
of the Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). See also Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972):
Persons “wandering or strolling” from place to place have been extolled by
Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay….[T]hese activities are historically part
of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in
the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have
been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and
self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the
right of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the
right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits
rather than hushed, suffocated silence.
They are embedded in Walt
Whitman’s writings, especially in his “Song of the Open Road.” They are
reflected, too, in the spirit of Vachel Lindsay’s “I Want to Go Wandering”, and
by Henry David Thoreau.
96

Jocelyn L. Santo, Down on the Corner: An Analysis of Gang-Related
Antiloitering Laws, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 269, 270-71 (2000) (discussing how the demise
of feudal Europe created a population of impoverished vagrants who wandered the
streets in search of work, prompting the ruling class to enact laws targeting this
perceived “menace to society”).
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compelled identification statutes reveals that they were first
promulgated with the explicit intention of limiting the
movement and activities of individuals deemed undesirable.
Today, compulsory identification requirements remain an
effective way to confine the populace and restrict the
individual’s existence.
Requests for identification inflict
substantial, be it unquantifiable, “psychic harm” on the
individual in that such requests inevitably damage one’s sense
of personal freedom. 97 The idea that compelled identification
has become an omnipresent component of the societal
landscape inevitably reduces one’s invaluable feeling of general
liberty. 98 Even individuals entirely innocent of wrongdoing, but
nevertheless unfortunate enough to elicit a reasonable
suspicion of criminality in well-intentioned law enforcement
officers, will inevitably experience considerable trepidation at
the prospect of having to identify oneself. 99 The perception that
the government might have cause to document one’s
movements and activities has the potential to dramatically
alter behavioral patterns, “not for fear of being caught doing
something illegal but because [individuals are] reluctant to
contribute to a permanent, government-held record of their
actions.” 100 The unavoidable effect is suppression of one’s
inquisitive nature and the gradual reduction of individual
vitality and spontaneity. This imposition on the conscience
inevitably leads society down the path of a more Orwellian
existence. Such a lifestyle not only stands juxtaposed with the
implicit ideals contained in the Fourth Amendment as
97
Steinbock, supra note 56, at 740 (“Identification checkpoints, it may be
argued, have an additional subjective effect on a grand scale: the psychic harm to free
people of having to ‘show your papers.’”). While the cited portion of Steinbock’s
commentary focuses on the potential effects of law enforcement checkpoints established
to combat crime and primarily deals with demands for the production of tangible
identity documents (a demand outside the context of Hiibel), I submit that the effects
on the individual consciousness and sense of freedom detailed by Steinbock are highly
relevant to the overall discussion of compulsory identification requirements.
98
See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First
Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125,
131 (2002) (concluding that an appropriate definition of privacy must account for a
person’s emotional and psychological response to surveillance).
99
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (discussing the
inevitable subjective feelings of intrusion that arise in an innocent motorist compelled
to stop at a sobriety checkpoint).
100
See Steinbock, supra note 56, at 745. See also, Christopher Slobogin,
Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72
MISS. L.J. 213, 251 (2002) (discussing how persons fearful of the potential for
government surveillance tend to develop a reduced sense of individualism which can
inhibit their conduct, associations, and activities).
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espoused in Terry, but also is entirely incompatible with the
fundamental nature of the American existence.
A free society which purports to value the sanctity of the
individual must protect the ability to move and associate in
relative anonymity without the fear of unreasonable
government intrusion. Indeed, some of the worst regimes
mankind has ever known utilized identification requirements
to maintain tabs on the citizenry, thereby limiting the ability to
associate freely and restricting all movement and activity
To be certain, the compulsory
deemed undesirable. 101
identification requirement at issue in Hiibel is a far cry from
the oppression associated with authoritative regimes like that
which presided in the former Soviet Union and the satellite
states of the Eastern European communist bloc. Nevertheless,
even a peripheral study of world history reveals that freedom of
movement, and the invaluable spontaneity of existence which
inherently accompanies such freedom, is inevitably stifled
when there exists a persistent fear of having to identify oneself
to state authorities. The Hiibel majority failed to adequately
consider
the
ramifications
of
Nevada’s
compulsory
identification requirement on a person’s subjective feelings of
constriction, and the degree to which this emotional response
will manifest itself by inhibiting the extemporaneousness
movement which has long constituted an essential component
of American life. Such imposition upon the individual weighs
heavily in upsetting the delicate balance between legitimate
state interest and intrusion upon personal sanctity which the
Terry Court sought to strike when it authorized a brief and
substantially restrained intrusion pursuant to a mere
reasonable suspicion.

101
Perhaps one of the most enduring impressions of a restricted populace is
that of the infamous Berlin Wall, and numerous other images of the oppression
associated with the satellite states of the former Soviet Union. However, demands for
identification also played a role in limiting the movement of blacks in segregated South
Africa and were utilized by the Nazis to prevent the flight of Holocaust victims. See
Sobel, supra note 59, at 344-47.
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V.

THE COMPULSORY IDENTIFICATION STATUTE AT ISSUE IN
HIIBEL IS FAR TOO BROAD IN SCOPE

A.

The Ideals of the Fourth Amendment As Advanced in
Terry Demand That a Compulsory Identification Statute
Require Additional Justification Beyond That Which
Occasioned the Initial Investigative Stop

The compelled identification requirement at issue in
Hiibel requires identification from a detained suspect without
any individualized justification and therefore is incompatible
with the Terry Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
Terry Court explicitly declined to empower police with an
automatic right to frisk during every investigatory stop. 102
Rather, in a carefully formulated opinion, the Court clearly
outlined the limited circumstances in which officers were
permitted to perform a frisk pursuant to a finding of
reasonable suspicion. 103 While an officer’s finding of reasonable
suspicion was deemed a sufficient predicate for performing the
initial stop, if the officer wished to heighten the intrusive
nature of the investigation by performing a frisk, additional
justification beyond that which occasioned the stop was
required. 104 Nevertheless, in blatant disregard for the Terry
Court’s requirement of heightened justification when an
investigative stop escalates in intrusiveness, the Nevada
statute authorizes the automatic right to demand identification
during every investigative stop without any additional
justification. Thus, the blanket identification requirement at
issue in Hiibel is contrary to the Fourth Amendment principles
advanced by Terry because it authorizes an automatic
identification requirement without requiring any additional
justification from the investigating officer.
The Terry Court intentionally stopped far short of
authorizing an automatic right to frisk, instead holding that a
frisk was constitutionally permissible only if the “officer is
justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and

102

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
Id. (limiting the right to frisk to instances where the police officer
concludes that “the persons with whom he is dealing with may be armed and presently
dangerous” and “where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
[the] reasonable fear for [the officer’s] safety or others’ safety”).
104
Id.
103
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presently dangerous to the officer or to others.” 105
The
requirement of a reasonable fear for officer safety as a
precondition for a frisk is not a mere formality. An officer’s
“street sense,” no matter how well honed, when standing alone,
is insufficient to justify a frisk. 106 Thus, the officer must be able
to articulate his basis for believing that crime is afoot and is
additionally required to articulate his basis for believing that a
frisk of the suspect was warranted. 107 This requirement of a
reasonable, articulable basis for conducting a frisk, beyond that
which provoked the initial investigatory stop, has the effect of
preventing overbroad, unnecessary, and unwarranted
intrusions. The Terry Court stated that the “demand for
specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth
By failing to require an
Amendment jurisprudence.” 108
additional individualized justification for the compelled
identification requirement, the Hiibel Court disregarded the
Terry Court’s explicit decree requiring police to sufficiently
justify actions which encroach on Fourth Amendment
guarantees.
Echoing concerns identical to those raised by the
authors of Terry, officer safety was an issue of great
prominence for the drafters of the Hiibel opinion. Writing on
behalf of the majority, Justice Kennedy concluded:
Obtaining a suspect’s name . . . serves important government
interests. Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a
suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or
mental disorder . . . . Officers called to investigate domestic disputes
need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess . . . the
threat to their own safety . . . . 109

Justice Kennedy is indeed correct in that the more
information possessed by investigating officers, the more likely
it is that an investigation can be conducted safely. However,
even if compelling identification might increase officer safety
incrementally in certain instances, the desire to protect and
promote law enforcement safety does not permit circumvention
of the Fourth Amendment. The Terry Court mandated that
police action undertaken during an investigatory stop
105
106
107
108
109

Id. at 24.
See Harris, supra note 80, at 13.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33.
Id. at 21 n.18.
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186.
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conducted pursuant to a mere reasonable suspicion requires
explicit justification. 110 However, the Nevada statute fails to
require any such justification, 111 instead compelling
identification from all detained suspects on the mere hunch
that knowledge of identity might possibly reveal that a certain
individual poses a danger.
Such encroachment on the
individual, requiring no reasonable justification whatsoever,
can not be aligned with the standards of the Fourth
Amendment as advanced in Terry.
All suspects are not equally dangerous, and therefore all
suspects cannot be treated as such. In Delaware v. Prouse the
Supreme Court stated that stopping an automobile and
detaining the driver in order to verify license and registration
is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if there exists
no articulable, reasonable suspicion that the particular
motorist is unlicensed or that the automobile is unregistered. 112
The holding in Prouse was dictated, at least in great part, by
the fact that the police action at issue was not based upon “an
appropriate factual basis for suspicion directed at a particular
automobile,” thereby inviting “intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches.” 113 The Prouse Court went on to state
that the police had chosen to rely on the flawed hypothesis that
“stopping apparently safe drivers is necessary only because the
danger presented by some drivers is not observable at the time
of the stop.” 114 The automatic identification requirement in
Hiibel has the effect of doing exactly that which the Court so
vehemently proscribed in Prouse. Admittedly, the statute in
Hiibel is tailored to a finding of reasonable suspicion, while the
officer who conducted the stop in Prouse was not acting
pursuant to any suspicion of criminal activity. However, the
logic advanced in the Prouse opinion is intuitively quite
analogous to the issues presented by Hiibel. Demanding
identification from all suspects stopped during a Terry stop,
absent a finding of some factual basis which confirms the
necessity for such a demand, is equivalent to stopping
motorists on the bare hunch that they may be unlicensed or
110
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (describing the necessary justification for a stop
and detailing the instances in which police may perform a frisk).
111
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2001).
112
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
113
Id. at 661.
114
Id.

2006]

WHERE EVERYBODY KNOWS YOUR NAME

1447

otherwise unfit to operate a vehicle. Such a policy, in which all
are made to endure an intrusion on the bare chance that an
officer might learn of an individual posing a threat, relies on
the very same “inarticulate hunches” that the Supreme Court
explicitly characterized as an insufficient justification for police
intrusion.
It is an unfortunate reality that present societal
conditions are such that police officers routinely expose
themselves to countless risks while pursuing their daily law
enforcement duties. For such service and sacrifice, society
should be eternally grateful. Nevertheless, the idea that a
blanket, automatic compulsory identification requirement may,
in certain instances, lessen the risks confronting an officer
performing an investigatory stop is insufficient to supercede
the mandates of the Fourth Amendment. When the Terry
Court rendered its decision requiring additional justification
before a suspect could be compelled to undergo a frisk, the
Court acknowledged that it was well aware of the numerous
dangers confronting the brave men and women of law
enforcement. 115 However, even when confronted with the
rampant infliction of violence on the nation’s police officers, the
Terry Court refused to articulate a rule authorizing an officer
conducting an investigatory stop the automatic right to frisk.
Instead, the Terry Court sought to remain faithful to the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
intrusions while appeasing the competing interests which arise
In authorizing compelled
from an investigative stop. 116
identification without requiring any additional justification,
the Hiibel majority disregarded the Fourth Amendment ideals
espoused in Terry regarding the need for additional
justification when police seek to undertake action during an
investigative stop which will heighten the intrusion
experienced by the individual.

115
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24 (“American criminals have a long tradition of
armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are
killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded. Virtually all of these
deaths and a substantial portion of the injuries are inflicted with guns and knives.”).
The Court acknowledged that in the first half of the 1960’s alone, some several
hundred police officers were killed while performing their law enforcement duties. Id.
at 24 n.21.
116
The Court stated that the dual interests of consequence in Terry were “the
neutralization of danger to the policeman in the investigative circumstance and the
sanctity of the individual.” Id. at 26.
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The Statute at Issue in Hiibel is Insufficiently Tailored
in That It Compels Identification Even When Entirely
Unwarranted

The Nevada statute at issue in Hiibel is far too broad in
scope because it requires identification from all suspects
detained pursuant to a reasonable suspicion, irrespective of the
circumstances surrounding the stop. The blanket application
of the compelled identification statute disregards the fact that
many times an officer confronting a suspect will have his
suspicion quickly dispelled, at which time compelled
identification can no longer be said to be consistent with the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.
For
instance, suppose upon being detained by the investigating
officer, Terry stated that he was simply having a great deal of
trouble selecting an engagement ring from the impressive
selection in the store’s display window.
Assuming the
investigating officer found Terry’s explanation for his behavior
entirely credible and therefore no longer suspected Terry of
“casing” the storefront in preparation for a robbery, the officer
would be without the authority to continue the investigative
detention. The reasonable suspicion which justified the initial
stop having dissipated, continued detainment would be
unreasonable.
A similar situation can easily be hypothesized in the
factual circumstances of Hiibel. As previously discussed,
Deputy Dove approached Larry Hiibel in order to investigate
an alleged assault of the female passenger in the truck. 117 For
illustrative purposes, consider the following hypothetical which
slightly alters the facts of the investigative stop at issue in
Hiibel. Suppose that rather than being entirely uncooperative,
Hiibel instead vehemently insisted to Deputy Dove that an
assault had not taken place. His daughter’s screams were not
cries of pain or alarm, but merely joyous exaltations that could
have easily been misinterpreted by a concerned, but
uninformed, member of the public. Assume further that
Hiibel’s explanation is corroborated in full by his daughter.
Notwithstanding the inherent difficulty associated with
gauging the creditability of statements made by the possible
victim of a violent domestic dispute, assuming that Deputy
Dove’s experience as an officer led him to conclude that Hiibel’s
117

Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 180 (2004).
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explanation was entirely truthful, there would no longer be any
reasonable suspicion of criminality afoot. When suspicion of
criminality dissipates, there is no authority to continue an
investigative detainment, let alone compel identification.
It is a settled principle of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that police officers are not permitted to rely upon
a citizen’s refusal to cooperate to furnish the minimal level of
objective justification required to authorize detention or
seizure. 118 However, the statute at issue in Hiibel authorizes
exactly that. Even if the officer’s suspicion quickly dissipates
upon undertaking an investigation, identification can still
nevertheless be compelled. A person who has alleviated the
officer’s suspicions of possible criminal behavior can
nevertheless be made to provide identification or face arrest
and criminal sanction. 119
Such an occurrence will not be confined to classroom
hypotheticals. Officers frequently stop persons who upon
detainment are found to have been engaging in entirely lawful
behavior. For example, in Martiszus v. Washington County, an
officer patrolling in a police cruiser in the early morning hours
observed an automobile stopped on the shoulder of the road
with what appeared to be a leg emerging from the open driverside door. 120 The officer believed that the vehicle’s occupant
might be drunk or perhaps involved in an assault. However,
when the officer instituted an investigation, the suspect
immediately explained that he was merely performing repairs
on his automobile, an explanation clearly corroborated by the
circumstances of the encounter (suspect was holding tools,
appeared to be in the process of making repairs, etc.). 121
Nevertheless, apparently perturbed by the motorist’s abrasive
tone and dismissive demeanor, the officer continued with the
Terry stop even after the suspect had promptly alleviated any
suspicion of criminality. While the officer’s initial suspicion of
criminal activity was quite reasonable, his fears were quickly
dispelled and no additional facts arose during the encounter to
support a revitalized reasonable belief of criminality. 122
118

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991).
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2001) (the statutory language contains no
provision which allows for circumvention of the name requirement in a situation where
the officer’s initial suspicion has dissipated).
120
325 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1163 (D. Or. 2004).
121
Id. at 1171.
122
Id.
119
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Therefore, the court in Martiszus concluded that the intrusion
was unreasonable in so far as it lasted beyond the vitality of
the officer’s initial finding of reasonable suspicion. 123 As stated
in Martiszus, “Though an officer’s detention may have been
justified at its inception, the detention exceeds Terry
boundaries when it continues unreasonably despite dissipation
of the officer’s initial suspicion.” 124 Therefore, the statute at
issue in Hiibel is unreasonable. Nevada’s stop and identify
statute impermissibly requires identification from all those
detained pursuant to a reasonable suspicion of criminality,
even in the far from uncommon instance where the reasonable
suspicion which served as the predicate for the stop has been
alleviated. The paradigm of the Fourth Amendment is entirely
inconsistent with such an intrusive requirement.
VI.

LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES

If the ideals embodied in the Fourth Amendment are to
be respected, compelled identification pursuant to a mere
reasonable suspicion of criminality must be deemed
unreasonable. However, short of an outright ban on compelled
identification, there exist methods of narrowly tailoring a
compulsory identification requirement so as to lessen the
intrusion upon the rights of the individual. The flexibility of
our federalist system of governance grants the individual
states the freedom to pursue their own legislative initiatives.
Admittedly, a “hundred flowers” approach 125 to a hot-button
issue like crime prevention and officer safety, especially in
today’s charged political climate, may seem an especially
combustible issue for elected officials wary of appearing weak
However, if the guarantees of the Fourth
on crime. 126

123

Id.
Id. at 1169.
125
During a brief two-year period in the mid nineteen fifties, Mao Zedong
encouraged Chinese intellectuals to openly discuss the nation’s problems and formulate
alternative problem-solving approaches in order to strengthen Chinese society. Mao’s
brief flirtation with intellectual freedom and a democratic approach to governance was
inspired by a poetic passage which read, “Let a hundred flowers bloom: let a hundred
schools of thought contend.”
Hundred Flowers Campaign, Nation Master
Encyclopedia, available at http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/HundredFlowers-Campaign (last visited Jan. 3, 2005).
126
Consider that polling conducted by the New York Times in conjunction
with CBS News in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 found that
seventy percent of Americans were willing to surrender personal freedoms in order to
make the nation safer. YALE KASMIR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 374 (10th
124
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Amendment are to remain viable, it is imperative that
legislation be structured so as to best protect the respect for the
integrity of the individual which exists as the bedrock principle
of the American institution of governance.
The least constitutionally offensive method of
formulating a compelled identification statute is to tailor the
requirement to allow the suspect the initial opportunity to
dispel the officer’s suspicions before a demand for identification
becomes compulsory. Using this legislative archetype, it is only
after the officer’s investigation and the initial interaction with
the suspect has failed to adequately alleviate suspicion that a
request for identification must be obeyed. Such a statute
would prevent a citizen who has engaged in entirely lawful
conduct, mistakenly misinterpreted as criminal, from being
compelled to needlessly endure the substantial intrusion
constituted by involuntary revelation of identity. Offering the
citizenry an initial opportunity to dispel the officer’s suspicion
would go a long way in curing the overreaching that plagues
the statute at issue in Hiibel. Before subjecting a person to the
harrowing experience of custodial arrest, 127 legislatures would
be better served if they drafted legislation whereby compelled
identification, followed by arrest for noncompliance, was a
tactic of last resort to be utilized only when traditional
investigative methods fail to dispel suspicion. Consider Welsh
v. Wisconsin, where the Supreme Court held that the
legislature’s decision not to impose incarceration for a statutory
infraction is the best indicator of the state’s level of interest in
taking custody of individuals who commit a violation. 128 Thus,
the fact that Nevada merely imposes a monetary fine upon
obtaining a conviction for failure to identify is further evidence
of the appropriateness of compelling identification only after
granting the suspect an opportunity to dispel suspicion. Since
arrest for failure to identify would not seem to be a pressing
state interest, legislatures should afford a detained suspect the

ed. 2002). See also, Harris, supra note 80, at 39 (“[I]t is hardly surprising to find that
most people would support crime-fighting efforts of questionable constitutionality.”).
127
Arrest is highly intrusive in that it grants the right to use force to affect
the arrest, to transport the person to the police station, and to handcuff, book, and
fingerprint the person. Arrest also authorizes police to detain the arrestee for a
prolonged period prior to presentation before a magistrate. Brief of Amici Curiae
American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of Petitioners, at 21, Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408).
128
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1986).
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opportunity to dispel suspicion before an identification demand
becomes compulsory.
Admittedly, the legislative proposal detailed above may
appear somewhat inadequate in that it fails to sufficiently
protect the officer conducting the investigative stop. However,
municipalities attempting to better ensure officer safety should
not adopt measures which require suspects to identify
themselves to law enforcement as a preliminary matter during
each and every investigative stop. Such a blanket, automatic
identification requirement is far too invasive. Rather, states
should adopt legislation that incorporates the ideals
encompassed in the automatic frisk doctrine in order to better
balance individual integrity with the legitimate needs of law
enforcement.
As previously discussed, the Terry court specifically
authorized the frisking of a suspect detained pursuant to a
reasonable suspicion of criminality only when there exists a
reasonable fear for officer safety. 129 In Sibron v. New York the
Court opined that officers have an automatic right to frisk a
suspect in one of two situations; either the suspect exhibits
some outward sign of being armed or the suspected crime, by
its very nature, is one of violence. 130 Over time, case law has
begun to expand the circumstances in which automatic frisk is
permissible. In addition to the situation where the crime
suspected is an inherently violent offense, when the offense
suspected is one that involves the mere possibility of armed
violence, a search in the form of a frisk is permissible. 131
Additionally, persons suspected of a drug crime, even be it a
minor offense, may be frisked immediately upon detention
129
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968). In Terry, the Court concluded that
since the suspects had been observed in what appeared to be preparation for a robbery,
an offense “likely to involve the use of weapons,” the investigating officer acted
properly in conducting a frisk. Id.
130
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) (“In the case of a self-protective
search for weapons, [a police officer] must be able to point to particular facts from
which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.”); Id. at 74
(Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he right to frisk is automatic when an officer lawfully
stops a person suspected of a crime whose nature creates a substantial likelihood that
he is armed. . . .”). See also Harris supra note 74, at 4, 5 (“[T]he Supreme Court has
always maintained that police could perform frisks – pat down searches of the outer
clothing of suspects – only if the officer suspected a violent crime was afoot, or if the
individual suspect showed some sign of being armed and dangerous.”).
131
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-45 (1972). In Adams, an informant
apprised police officers that a person seated in a nearby automobile was carrying a
handgun, prompting the officers to approach the individual. When the suspect ignored
instructions to exit the vehicle, the officer removed a gun from the suspect’s waistband.
Id.
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regardless of whether they exhibit any tell-tale signs of danger
to the investigating officer. 132 The propensity for burglars to
carry instruments capable of inflicting harm has resulted in
burglary also being treated as an offense authorizing automatic
Furthermore, numerous cases hold that law
frisk. 133
enforcement personnel may frisk persons “based not on the
crime or outward signs that the suspect may be armed, but
because the situation presents the police with circumstances
detrimental to their safety.” 134
Adoption of compelled identification legislation which
embodies the ideals of the automatic frisk doctrine is far more
compatible with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than the
intrusive statute at issue in Hiibel. A prominent justification
put forth by the Hiibel majority in upholding the Nevada
statute was the idea that compelled identification increases
officer safety. 135 Thus, aligning the rationale of the Hiibel
majority with the extensive body of automatic frisk cases, an
officer performing an investigative stop pursuant to a
reasonable suspicion would be permitted to issue a compulsory
demand for identification only when the suspected offense is
one which carries a propensity for violence or the specific
factual circumstances of the stop are such that there exists a
reasonable fear for officer safety. The wide array of offenses
which have been viewed by various courts as sufficient to
authorize an automatic frisk provide a sufficient framework for
instances when compelled identification should be deemed
permissible.
Of course, adoption of the proposal set forth above
would dictate that Larry Hiibel, a suspect in an alleged assault,
132
See Harris, supra note 80, at 24 (describing weapons as tools of the trade
for narcotics trafficking, thus justifying frisk of suspected drug offenders upon
detainment). See also, e.g., United States v. Brown, 913 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1990)
(“Since weapons and violence are frequently associated with drug transactions, the
officers reasonably believed that the individuals with whom they were dealing were
armed and dangerous.”).
133
See, e.g., Gutierres v. State, 793 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1990) (“While burglary is
not per se a crime of violence, it is a serious crime and . . . someone suspected of
burglary would carry a weapon and resort to violence.”). See also, Harris, supra note
80 at 26-27 (“Courts frequently allow automatic frisks of burglary suspects . . . . As
with narcotics cases, the reasoning is that those involved might have weapons.”).
134
Harris, supra note 80, at 31. Factors highlighted as authorizing frisk in
such circumstances include presence in a high crime locale, a larger number of suspects
than officers, darkness, etc. Id.
135
Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004) (Police “need
to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their
own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.”).
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would still be required to identify himself to the investigating
deputy. However, such an approach is far more desirable than
the automatic identification requirement upheld in Hiibel.
Persons not suspected of a crime likely to pose a threat to the
officer would not be needlessly compelled to reveal their
identity. Just as an automatic frisk is not authorized in
accordance with every Terry stop, offenses which do not present
a reasonable fear for officer safety should not grant an
automatic right to compel identification. For instance, persons
suspected of loitering, littering, or a host of other similarly
trivial offenses do not inherently pose danger to the
investigating officer. Therefore, compelling identification in
such instances cannot be said to appreciably increase officer
safety to the point where the intrusion upon the individual is
justified. As with a frisk, if the offense which serves as a
predicate for the Terry stop is insufficient to create a
reasonable fear for officer safety, but the circumstances of the
stop (i.e. suspect’s demeanor and behavior as the investigative
stop unfolds) reasonably creates such fear, compelled
identification could then be required. 136
One need not worry that limiting the instances in which
compelled identification is allowable and requiring officers to
justify their decisions to compel identification will substantially
expose police officers to harm. In a hearing to adjudicate an
allegation that a suspect was illegally searched during the
course of a Terry stop, testimony given by police officers is
entitled substantial deference. 137 While the police officer may
be called upon to explain what made the situation appear
sufficiently dangerous to warrant a frisk, law enforcement is
rarely, if ever, required to submit statistics in support of its
assumption that a particular class of suspect poses a threat. 138
Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly instructed lower courts to
defer to the testimony by police, holding that evidence “must be
seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars,
but as understood by those versed in the field of law

136
See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“If
the nature of the suspected offense creates no reasonable apprehension for the officer’s
safety, I would not permit him to frisk unless other circumstances did so.”).
137
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
138
Harris, supra note 80, at 33 (“Seldom, if ever, do police supply any data
substantiating their assumptions that the suspect was armed and dangerous; rather, it
is simply assumed.”).
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enforcement.” 139 Thus, if similar deference is afforded the
testimony given by officers called upon to explain their
rationale for compelling identification, police will retain the
ability to respond to the threats which confront them in the
field, and the integrity of the individual subjected to the
detention will not be unnecessarily trampled.
Irrespective of the particulars of the stop and identify
statute adopted by a particular jurisdiction, no record of the
citizen-police encounter should be made if the investigative
stop ultimately proves unfounded or fruitless. As previously
discussed, the feeling that the authorities are consciously
documenting an individual’s activities has a dramatic adverse
effect on the mental well-being of the populace. In order to
lessen the psychic trauma of the encounter, when an
investigative stop fails to produce justification for continued
detainment, no permanent record should be made of the
encounter. Inevitably, adoption of such a policy would mean
that a certain number of criminally inclined individuals, either
clever enough to dispel an officer’s well-founded suspicions or
fortunate enough to have encountered the officer in a situation
where continued detainment is legally impermissible, might
perhaps benefit from the opportunity to avoid documentation.
While such an occurrence is truly unfortunate, this is an
unavoidable burden that society must shoulder in order to live
in an environment sufficiently respectful of individual integrity
and freedom. 140
Furthermore, an officer who remained suspicious of an
individual detained during a Terry stop is not without recourse.
Even if the suspect’s identity were to go undocumented at the
conclusion of the fruitless Terry stop, a record of the encounter
could still be gleaned by other means. Should an officer feel
that such action is warranted, there has never existed any
principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence which would
prevent an officer remaining suspicious of an individual
detained during a Terry stop from continuing to observe the
139
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418. Further evidencing the degree of deference
deemed appropriate, the Court in Cortez advanced the rationale that judgments made
by officers in the field are not to be viewed in isolation with the benefit of hindsight
analysis. Instead, the Court stated that “the totality of the circumstances – the whole
picture – must be taken into account.” Id. at 417-18.
140
English legal scholar Sir William Blackstone, a champion of egalitarian
justice, famously opined that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffer.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *358 (GARLAND PUBL’G
1978).
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suspect even after the investigative detention has concluded. 141
Practically speaking, such continued observation will
frequently result in the documentation of a license plate
number or street address from which the officer could
accurately record his interaction with the suspect without
having to rely on information gained through compulsion.
Legislation of this sort, in which the identity of the individual
is not recorded when the Terry stop proves fruitless, is far more
desirable than that adopted in Nevada because it better
respects individual integrity by seeking to lessen the
psychological harm occasioned by compelled revelation of
identity.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Since the very earliest days of the Union, our nation has
rested on a foundation grounded in the bedrock of personal
freedom and respect for the individual. While on its face the
Fourth Amendment outlines proscriptions against oppressive
government action, at its very core, the prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure seeks to protect personal
integrity and individual sanctity. At a very fundamental level,
the compulsory identification statute at issue in Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial District of Nevada is an assault on individual
integrity. In upholding the Nevada statute at issue in Hiibel,
the Supreme Court not only upset the delicate balance struck
by the Terry Court between the legitimate needs of law
enforcement and the integrity of the individual citizen, but also
blatantly disregarded the implicit ideals set forth by the
founders in adopting the provisions of the Fourth Amendment.
However, while the Supreme Court’s ratification of the Nevada
statute may seem a damaging blow to the personal freedoms
espoused in the Bill of Rights, diligence on the part of the
citizenry in demanding that our elected representatives remain
faithful to the most basic principles of our nation can lessen the
impact of the Court’s mistake. President Dwight Eisenhower
once stated “There is nothing wrong with America that the
faith, love of freedom, intelligence and energy of her citizens

141
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) (describing an officer’s
procedure of observing persons he should encounter as “routine”).

2006]

WHERE EVERYBODY KNOWS YOUR NAME

1457

cannot cure.” 142 Through insistence upon stop and identify
statutes more consistent with the Constitution’s ideals, the
citizenry has an opportunity to prove Eisenhower’s inspiring
commentary entirely accurate.
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Quote of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, unattributed, available at
http://www.quotationspage.com/search.php3?homesearch=freedom&page=6
(last
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